Bear with me here.
A common question that comes when doing apologetics is how the following three coincide: human free will, God’s omniscience, and justified condemnation.
This question is asked of Ravi Zacharias here:
My question has to do with Ravi Zacharias’s response. He explains how a naturalist’s worldview leads to a world without free will; however, I have trouble with his argument.
Question: Does “what I will do tomorrow” exist as a well defined object?
In a determined world, it is certainly a well defined object. Moreover, does not God’s omniscience make it so that “what I will do tomorrow” is a well defined object.
Most commonly, this cumbersome dilemma about God knowing what we are going to do is answered by foreknowledge: that, although God knows what will we choose, we still are the ones who choose to do “what [we] will do tomorrow.” Hence, it is still deterministic – we just “chose” – if you will – “what [we] will do tomorrow.”
In the view of naturalism, is not the notion of free will equivalent? Although naturalism demands that we not transcend past our physical bodies, it allows us free will in the sense that the self still chooses “what [we] will do tomorrow,” since naturalism demands that all things including the self must be materialistic.
Ravi refers to how a materialistic self has no way of discerning truth since it is biological automaton and its thoughts are determined by the initial conditions of the beginning of universe (since naturalism demands that physical objects must obey laws). In naturalism, however, that is equivalent to saying that the materialistic self has no way of discerning truth since it is the result of the self – this is due to the fact that the self is a biological automaton.
Surely, then, one could argue that there is no difference in the ability to discern truth between the materialistic self of naturalism and the transcendent self of Christianity since the self – whether it is materialistic or transcendental – is (pre)determined.
What am I missing here?