Helegian moral reciprocity

How do we counter Hegelian moral reciprocity?
The argument for God In terms of morality and from the appeal to the objective, ontic referent is quite a secure position, I feel. All opposing arguments, bar one perhaps, end in a subjective, self referring tautology. However the Hegelian moral philosophy seems to avoid this by saying that we know what is good or right because it reflects how we would want to be, or expect to be, treated by others. Could it be said this amounts to an objective ontic referent since it reflects what ‘is the case’ and not what ‘ought to be the case’?
If so does this make a secure case for absolute morality without appeal to God or a transcendent moral giver?

Hi, David! I am no expert in philosophy, but it does seem to me that the Hegelian moral philosophy is inadequate on two counts. First, our expectations of others’ conduct toward us are conditioned by our culture, our experiences, and our own desires. There are certain basics that cut across cultural lines (see C. S. Lewis’ discussions of the Moral Law in Mere Christianity and The Abolition of Man), but someone who grew up under conditions of severe child abuse might have very different expectations from those of a spoiled brat whose every wish was gratified and who was repeatedly bailed out of any difficulties cased by selfish behavior. Second, how does one leap from an essentially self-centered position of what I expect or desire to a concept of what is good or right independent of what I wish—a concept that may actually be quite inconvenient to me at points. And why should I expect others to share my desires and expectations and agree with them, unless I am referring to something that exists independently of us both. Perhaps I am misunderstanding Hegel’s position, but without some external reference point to which moral beliefs and expectations can be anchored, I don’t see how Hegelian oral philosophy avoids a slide into relativism.

Good points Avalyn, I’ll cogitate on them - thanks